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Abstract
We test the link between labor market rigidities and job performance in the public sector using a novel
outcome variable namely, the number of days that it takes to the postal service to return letters sent to nonexistent foreign addresses, a measure that we argue is an excellent proxy for job performance. We find a
positive and statistically significant link between these two variables, regardless of the labor rigidity
measure employed, changes in specification, and even unlikely endogeneity considerations, which suggest
that this finding may be causal.
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Introduction
Economic research provides plenty of evidence that indicates that excessive labor market rigidities

will compromise efficiency by not allowing an economy to optimally allocate resources among sectors of
the economy. This is so because, as it has been typically argued, rigidities distort incentives of economic
agents, which translates in reduced economic performance. While this view is not particularly controversial
in economics, evidence on the the extent to which performance changes due to labor market rigidities has
proved difficult to measure, as accurate outcome variables that gauge job performance have proved
particularly difficult to come by.
We provide evidence on the link between labor market rigidities and job performance in the public
sector by using a novel outcome variable, namely, the time it takes for the national postal service to return
letters to a foreign sender when such letters were sent to non-existent addresses. In fact, as required by
postal conventions, countries must return an undeliverable letter to the country of origin for otherwise they
would be violating an international agreement. In addition this agreement also contemplates the fact that
the cost of returning any undeliverable letters is paid by the sending country and not the receiving one. In
the context above, the use of this outcome variable is particularly useful for our purposes for several reasons.
In particular, it truly measures performance as it only requires that workers perform their duties, in this
case, the very simple task of, essentially, placing a wrongly sent letter to a “return bin” and make sure that
the letters are sent for delivery back to the sender country. This simple task requires little-to-no education,
very little manual or intellectual effort when the cost of returning the letter is borne by the sender. In short,
this variable simply measures whether workers do their job. In addition, we believe that this outcome
variable is rather relevant to measure performance in the public sector for despite the growth of online and
private delivery services, the demand for postal services has, if anything, grown over time worldwide and,
in fact, the postal service still delivers over 200 letters per person per year in industrial countries and remains
among the largest employers in most countries around the world (Chong, et al, 2014).
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology. Section 3 presents
our results, including the use of alternative measures of labor rigidity, the application of sensitivity analysis
to changes in specification, and endogeneity correction using instrumental variables. Finally, Section 4
concludes.
2.

Data and Methodology
The dependent variable, collected by Chong, et al (2014), measures the return time in days of letters

that were sent to nonexistent business addresses in 159 foreign countries. The letters were fully
standardized, sent via airmail to each of the five largest cities in 159 countries using correct international
postage. Two letters were sent to each city chosen. Each letter contained the same return address with the
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following phrase in large, bold letters in each envelope: “please, return to sender if undeliverable”. The
letters were dropped in street mailboxes in Cambridge, MA between 8 December 2010 and 4 February 2011
(Chong, et al, 2014). Our key labor market rigidity measure is an index that comes from Campos and Nugent
(2012) and was based on previous research that systematizes specific rigidity legislation using the
methodology described in Botero, et al (2004). In addition, we employ a series of control variables, most
of which were obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank, with the
exception of colonial heritage (Hensel, 2014) and perception of corruption (Transparency International,
2016). Table 1 presents variable definitions and corresponding sources. Table 2 shows summary statistics.
We use the following reduced form:
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑘 = 𝛼𝐿𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐼𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖 + 𝛿𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝜃𝑆𝑒𝑐. 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘
Where (i) Return Time denotes the number of days the letter 𝑘 in country 𝑖 took to be sent back1, (ii)
LAMRIG is the rigidity of employment legislation, (iii) GDP denotes the logarithm of the gross domestic
product per capita, (iv) CPI represents a corruption perception Index, (v) Growth denotes the rate of growth
and (vi) Sec.Enrol denotes the school enrollment. In addition, 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜌𝑖 represent country and year fixed
effects, and the last variable is the error term. The data for all the explanatory variables employ averages
for 2008 and 2009. The exception is our labor rigidity data, which is based on information that employs
averages from 2000 to 20042. In addition, all regressions are clustered at the country level. Finally, while
highly unlikely, we also pursue an instrumental variables using colonial heritage as a reasonable instrument
for our labor market rigidity index.
3.

Findings
Table 3 presents our main findings. We find that the labor rigidity coefficient is positively linked

to return days and is statistically significant at one percent in our preferred specification (Column 4). Thus,
the higher degree of rigidity in the labor market the worse the performance of workers. This may occur as
a result of moral hazard as jobs are secure and the likelihood of a worker being penalized or fired is reduced
drastically in rigid labor markets. Whereas endogeneity may not be a matter of particular concern given
that (i) it is unreasonable to expect that return time will affect rigidity levels and (ii) all the regressions
include country fixed and year effects, we still apply a two-stages approach in order to deal with this

1

We follow Chong, et al (2014) and use a cut-off of 423 days for the letters that were not sent back, which is when
they stopped collecting data.
2
Institutional data move rather slowly and as such, it is reasonable to assume that this difference in period does not
pose a problem as several other researchers have also argue (e.g, Botero, et al, 2004)
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potential issue, in particular, from an omitted variables perspective. We use colonial heritage (Hensel, 2014)
as instrument as this variable is strongly correlated with our potential endogenous variable, labor market
rigidity (Botero, et al, 2014), but it is not apparent that it may be directly linked with the return time of the
letters, as required. In Table 3, Column 5 we find supporting evidence that our findings may be causal,
which are also consistent with the reported F-test of excluded instruments3.
In Table 4 we show robustness tests by employing alternative rigidity measures. In particular we
use labor rigidity measures related to the cost of firing, dismissal, and severance payments in countries 4.
Our results are all very similar to our key finding and all are statistical at one percent as well.
Finally, in Table 5 we test whether our findings are robust to changes in specification (Sala-iMartín, 1997). To do this, we augment our benchmark specification using combinations of two variables
out of a pool of ten ancillary variables5. The variable of interest is robust with the dependent variables if
the weighted cdf(0) is greater than or equal to or higher than 0.90, which is what we find for all our labor
market rigidity measures. In fact, we find analogous results when using the instrumental variables case.
4.

Conclusions
We test the link between labor market rigidities and job performance in the public sector using a

novel outcome variable namely, the number of days that it takes to the postal service of a country to return
letters sent to non-existent foreign addresses, a measure that we argue is an excellent proxy for job
performance. We find a positive and statistically significant link between these two variables, regardless of
the labor rigidity measure employed, changes in specification, and even unlikely endogeneity
considerations, which suggests that this finding may be causal namely, from labor rigidity to reduced job
performance by workers.
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Table 1: Variable Definitions
Variable
Days to Return

LAMRIG Index

Colonial Heritage
Ln GDP per capita
Corruption

Growth GDP
Secondary Enrolment
Cost of Firing
Dismissal Procedure

Severance after 20 years

Definition
Number of days between the date the letter was sent and returned between
December 2010 and February 2011. Unreturned letters were assigned 423 days, an
arbitrary cutoff number chose by authors Source: Chong et al. (2014)
Rigidity of employment legislation Index 2000 – 2004 using methodology of
Botero, et al. (2004). Higher index indicates more rigidity. Source: Campos and
Nugent (2012)
Dummy variable equals to one if the country was once a colony, otherwise equals
to zero. Source: ICOW Colonial Data
Average 2008 and 2009 of Ln GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$). Source: World
Development Indicators
Average 2008 and 2009 of Inverse of Corruption Perception Index. The score
indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly
corrupt) to 10 (very clean). Source: Transparency International
Average 2008 and 2009 of GDP growth (annual %). Source: WDI.
Average 2008 and 2009 of School enrollment, secondary (% gross). Source: World
Bank
Average 2008 and 2009 Cost of Firing in days: Notice cost + Severance cost +
Penalty cost. Source: World Bank.
Average 2008 and 2009. Average of dummies: notify before dismiss, approval
before dismiss, notify before collective dismiss, approval before collective
dismiss, retraining before worker redundant, priority rules to redundancy
dismissal, priority rules to re-employment). Source: World Bank
Average 2008 and 2009 of Severance pay for redundancy dismissal after 20 years
of employment. Source: World Bank
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable
Days to Return
LAMRIG Index
Ln GDP per capita
Corruption Perception
Growth GDP
Secondary Enrolment
Cost of Firing
Dismissal Procedure
Severance after 20 years

Mean
228.22
158.55
8.50
-4.03
2.11
79.76
50.35
0.38
42.93

Std. Dev.
166.91
44.75
1.54
2.17
3.99
27.37
55.87
0.29
55.56

Min
6.00
45.71
5.37
-9.35
-10.07
11.56
0
0
0

Max
423
245
11.55
0
14.81
129.18
446.33
1
433.33
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Table 3: Main Results
Dependent Variable: Days to Return
LAMRIG Index
Ln GDP per capita

(1)
2.542***
(0.058)
-180.8***
(6.411)

(2)
0.410***
(0.028)
-3.808***
(0.693)
-63.919***
(2.566)

(3)
0.498***
(0.013)
-4.997***
(0.495)
-54.362***
(0.972)
-0.768***
(0.128)

1276.529***
(38.832)

456.471***
(5.915)

432.830***
(1.974)

(4)
1.121***
(0.190)
-17.41***
(3.672)
-24.472***
(5.755)
-3.910***
(0.152)
-0.400***
(0.148)
361.154***
(31.873)

0.517
0.463
1350

0.517
0.463
1350

0.517
0.463
1350

0.515
0.461
990

Corruption
Growth GDP pc
Secondary Enrolment
Constant
F-test of excluded instruments
Test of endogeneity (p value)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Observations

(5)
0.819**
(0.392)
4.304
(7.441)
-14.522***
(4.162)
-5.439***
(1.800)
-1.762***
(0.302)
226.268***
(80.312)
61.36
0.079

980

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Columns 1-5 employ ordinary least squares as well as
country and year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the city level. Column 6 applies an instrumental variable approach
with colonial heritage as the instrument.
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Table 4: Robustness to Changes in Rigidity Measures
Days to Return
Cost of Firing
Dismissal Procedure
Severance after 20 years
Ln GDP per capita
Corruption
Growth GDP
Secondary Enrolment
Constant
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Observations

(1)
0.712***
(0.104)

(2)

(3)

106.799***
(15.628)
0.503***
(0.074)
-4.498***
-4.819*** -15.076***
(1.276)
(1.229)
(0.272)
-52.271*** -37.575*** -48.285***
(0.959)
(1.191)
(0.376)
-5.262***
-0.777
-6.143***
(0.115)
(0.542)
(0.243)
-1.029***
-0.744***
-0.956***
(0.018)
(0.023)
(0.007)
559.141*** 433.543*** 635.428***
(7.544)
(25.922)
(3.619)
0.52
0.52
0.52
0.47
0.47
0.47
1060
1060
1060

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Regressions
include country and year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the city level.
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Table 5: Sensitivity to Changes in Specification
Cumulative
Distribution
Function at zero
1.332

Standard
Error

Statistical
Significance

0.104

0.96

Cost of Firing

0.892

0.09

0.94

Dismissal Procedure

102.46

15.23

0.90

Severance after 20 years

0.635

0.08

0.93

LAMRIG index

Following Sala-i-Martin (1997) a variable whose weighted cdf(0) is larger than 0.90 is significantly
correlated with the dependent variable (i.e. robust) at a ten percent significance level. The cdf is computed
assuming non-normality of the parameters estimated. Results are similar if we assume normality, instead.
We use our preferred specification shown in Table 3, Column 4. Results are analogous for the
instrumental variables case.
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Appendix: First Stage
(Instrumental Variables, Table 3, Column 5)
Colonial Heritage
Ln GDP per capita
Corruption
Growth GDP pc
Secondary Enrolment
Constant
R-squared
AdjR2
Observations

31.257***
(3.990)
0.998
(2.530)
-7.992***
(1.103)
-2.095***
(0.405)
-0.066
(0.087)
192.427***
(13.723)
0.13
0.12
980

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, **p<0.05,
***p<0.01. Regressions include country and year fixed
effects and standard errors clustered at the city level.

